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Jamming in Fixed-Rate Wireless Systems with
Power Constraints - Part II: Parallel Slow Fading
Channels
George T. Amariucai, Shuangqing Wei and Rajgopal Kannan
Abstract
This is the second part of a two-part paper that studies the problem of jamming in a fixed-rate transmission system with
fading. In the first part, we studied the scenario with a fast fading channel, and found Nash equilibria of mixed strategies for
short term power constraints, and for average power constraints with and without channel state information (CSI) feedback. We
also solved the equally important maximin and minimax problems with pure strategies. Whenever we dealt with average power
constraints, we decomposed the problem into two levels of power control, which we solved individually. In this second part of
the paper, we study the scenario with a parallel, slow fading channel, which usually models multi-carrier transmissions, such as
OFDM. Although the framework is similar as the one in Part I [1], dealing with the slow fading requires more intricate techniques.
Unlike in the fast fading scenario, where the frames supporting the transmission of the codewords were equivalent and completely
characterized by the channel statistics, in our present scenario the frames are unique, and characterized by a specific set of channel
realizations. This leads to more involved inter-frame power allocation strategies, and in some cases even to the need for a third
level of power control. We also show that for parallel slow fading channels, the CSI feedback helps in the battle against jamming,
as evidenced by the significant degradation to system performance when CSI is not sent back. We expect this degradation to
decrease as the number of parallel channels M increases, until it becomes marginal for M → ∞ (which can be considered as
the case in Part I).
Keywords: Slow fading channels, outage probability, jamming, zero-sum game, fixed rate, power control.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of jamming plays an extremely important role in ensuring the quality and security of wireless communications,
especially at this moment when wireless networks are quickly becoming ubiquitous. Although the recent literature covers
a wide variety of jamming problems [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], the investigation of optimal jamming and anti-jamming
strategies for the parallel slow-fading channel is missing.
The parallel slow-fading channel is a widely used model for OFDM transmission [9]. Since the usual definition of capacity
does not provide a positive performance indicator for this model, a more adequate performance measure is the probability of
outage [9], defined as the probability that the instantaneous mutual information characterizing the parallel channel, under a
given channel realization, is below a fixed transmission rate R. Under the optimal diversity-multiplexing tradeoff, the parallel
slow-fading channel with M subchannels is known [9] to yield an M -fold diversity gain over the scalar single antenna channel.
However the diversity-multiplexing tradeoff only gives an approximative analytical evaluation of the probability of outage for
a given rate R and a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and this approximation is usually accurate only in the high SNR region.
Thus, for evaluating a system which functions at a moderate SNR, the exact probability-of-outage vs. transmission-rate curve is
often computed numerically. Moreover, the high SNR assumption is clearly not adequate for studying a practical uncorrelated
jamming situation, where the jammer’s power should be considered at least comparable to the legitimate transmitter’s.
Therefore, we aim at deriving the exact probability of outage achievable in the presence of a jammer, over our parallel
slow fading channel, for a fixed transmission rate R. Our channel model is depicted in Figure 1. The span of a codeword is
denoted by “frame”. To model our parallel slow fading channel, each frame is divided into M “blocks” (corresponding to the
M subchannels), each of which consists of N channel uses, like in Figure 2.
The channel fading is slow, such that the corresponding channel coefficients remain constant over each block and vary
independently across different blocks. The channel coefficients are complex numbers, and their squared absolute values are
denoted as hm. The vector h = [h0, h1, . . . , hM−1] of channel coefficients over a whole frame is assumed to be perfectly
known to the receiver, and can be made available by feedback (if the receiver wishes) to the transmitter (Tx), and jammer
(Jx) before the transmission begins. It was shown in [10] that the feedback of channel state information (CSI) (i.e. the M
coefficients of a frame) brings moderate benefits for the parallel slow-fading channel without jamming. Thus, by employing
optimal power control strategies, the transmitter can lower the probability of outage for fixed transmission rate and SNR. In this
paper, we study both the scenarios when the CSI is fed back by the legitimate receiver – and hence all M channel coefficients
characterizing a frame are available to both transmitter and jammer in a non-causal fashion (it is only natural to assume that if
the transmitter has full CSI, the jammer can get the same information by eavesdropping) – and the scenario when no feedback
takes place and thus the CSI is only available to the receiver.
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2In addition to fading, the transmission is affected by additive white complex Gaussian noise (AWGN), and by a jammer.
The jammer has no knowledge about the transmitter’s output, or even the codebook that the transmitter is using, and hence it
deploys its most harmful strategy: it transmits white complex Gaussian noise [11] (AWGJ in Figure 1).
The transmitter (Tx) uses a complex Gaussian codebook. Over a given frame, it allocates power Pm to block m, 0 ≤ m ≤
M − 1, while the jammer (Jx) invests power Jm in jamming the same block with noise. As assumed in [10], the number of
channel uses per block is large N → ∞ in order to average out the impact of the Gaussian noise. Under these assumptions,
the instantaneous mutual information characterizing a subchannel m is given by I(hm, Pm, Jm) = log(1 + hmPmσ2
N
+Jm
), where
σ2N is the variance of the ambient AWGN. The following denotations will be repeatedly used in the sequel:
• Power allocated by the transmitter over a frame:
PM =
1
M
∑M−1
m=0 Pm;
• Power allocated by the jammer over a frame:
JM =
1
M
∑M−1
m=0 Jm;
• Instantaneous mutual information between the transmitter and the receiver over a frame:
IM =
1
M
∑M−1
m=0 I(hm, Pm, Jm).
Note that PM is a function of the channel realization h, so we often write PM (h) when this relation needs to be explicitly
emphasized. PM (h) can also be interpreted as the function giving the power distribution across different frames. We also use
PM (h) and JM (h) to denote inter-frame power allocation for the case M = 1, since in this case a frame only contains one
block. Like in [1], throughout this paper we shall also use the notation c = exp(MR) for simplicity.
As depicted in Figure 1, our channel model is similar to that of [2]. The difference, however, is that we investigate the
jamming problem in slow-fading channels and hence the probability of outage, defined as the probability that the instantaneous
mutual information IM of the channel is lower than the fixed transmission rate R [10] is considered as an objective function
Pout = Pr(IM < R) (while [2] assumes fast fading and uses the ergodic capacity as objective). Our problem is still
formulated as a two-player, zero-sum game. The transmitter wants to achieve reliable communication and hence minimize the
outage probability, while the jammer wants to induce outage and maximize the outage probability. Strategies consist of varying
transmission powers based on the CSI (i.e. the perfect knowledge of h) if available, or solely on the channel’s statistics if CSI
is not available. The properties of our different objective function make our new jamming and anti-jamming problem much
more challenging to solve.
It is easy to find similarities to the fixed rate system with fast fading which was studied in the first part of this paper [1].
In fact, the fast fading scenario of [1] can be obtained as a particular case of the current setup, by allowing a large number
of blocks per frame M → ∞ (corresponding to an infinite number of subchannels). In doing so, the different frames are no
longer characterized by their respective channel realizations, but instead they become long enough to display the statistical
properties of the channel coefficient and thus become equivalent. This is why our present parallel slow fading scenario is
more involved than the fast fading model of Part I of this paper [1], especially when it comes to resolving the optimal power
allocation between different frames. Sometimes this additional complexity leads to an additional level of power control, as we
shall see in Section IV.
Our contributions are summarized below:
• We first investigate the case where the receiver feeds back the channel state information (CSI) which becomes available
to both transmitter and jammer. For the short-term power constraints case we show the existence of and find a Nash
equilibrium of pure strategies. Note that for a two-person, zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria have the same value [12].
Since an equilibrium of pure strategies is also an equilibrium of mixed strategies, our Nash equilibrium of pure strategies
provides the complete solution of the game.
• For the case with long-term power constraints we find the maximin and minimax solutions of pure strategies, and show they
do not coincide (hence the non-existence of a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies). Traditional methods of optimization,
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Fig. 1. Channel model
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such as the KKT conditions, cannot be applied to solve for these solutions completely. Therefore we provide a new,
more intuitive approach based on the special duality property discussed in Appendix II-D of the first part of this paper
[1]. As argued in [1], Nash equilibria of mixed strategies may not always be the best solutions to jamming problems.
A smart jammer could eavesdrop the channel and detect both the legitimate transmitter’s presence and its power level.
Therefore, we believe that the maximin and minimax problem formulations with pure strategies are of great importance
in understanding and resolving the practical jamming situations (in the worst case, they provide upper and lower bounds
on the system’s performance).
• The optimal pure strategies of allocating power between frames, for the maximin and minimax formulations, are found as
the solutions of two simple numerical algorithms. These algorithms function according to two different techniques which
we explain in the sequel and we dub as “the vase water filling problems”.
• Mixed strategies are discussed next. We show that for completely characterizing this scenario we need three different
levels of power control. We then particularize and obtain numerical results for the special simple case with only one block
per frame (M = 1).
• Finally, we compare our results to the case when the channel state information is only available to the receiver. We derive
a Nash equilibrium for M = 1, and show that unlike in the fast fading scenario (where CSI feedback brings negligible
improvements), under our current parallel slow fading channel model, perfect knowledge about the CSI at all parties can
substantially improve performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II deals with the short term power constrained problem when full CSI is available
to all parties. Section III studies the scenario with long term power constraints and pure strategies under the same assumption
of available CSI. Mixed strategies are discussed in Section IV. For comparison purposes, Section V presents results for the
case with no CSI feedback. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. CSI AVAILABLE TO ALL PARTIES. JAMMING GAME WITH SHORT-TERM POWER CONSTRAINTS
The game with short-term power constraints is the less complex of the two games we discuss in the sequel. In this game,
the transmitter’s goal is to: {
Minimize Pr(IM (h, P (h), J(h)) < R)
Subject to PM (h) ≤ P ,with prob. 1 (1)
while the jammer’s goal is to: {
Maximize Pr(IM (h, P (h), J(h)) < R)
Subject to JM (h) ≤ J ,with prob. 1. (2)
We shall prove that this game is closely related to a different two player, zero-sum game, which has the mutual information
between Tx and Rx as a cost/reward function:
Tx
{
Maximize IM (h, P (h), J(h))
Subject to PM (h) ≤ P , (3)
Jx
{
Minimize IM (h, P (h), J(h))
Subject to JM (h) ≤ J . (4)
This latter game is characterized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The game of (3) and (4) has a Nash equilibrium point given by the following strategies:
P ∗(hm) =
 (
1
η −
σ2N
hm
)+ if hm < σ
2
Nη
1−σ2
N
ν
hm
η(hm+
η
ν
) if hm ≥
σ2Nη
1−σ2
N
ν
(5)
4J∗(hm) =
 0 if hm <
σ2Nη
1−σ2
N
ν
hm
ν(hm+
η
ν
) − σ2N if hm ≥
σ2Nη
1−σ2
N
ν
(6)
where η and ν are constants that can be determined from the power constraints.
Proof: The proof is a straightforward adaptation of Section IV.B in [2], and is outlined in Appendix I.
The connection between the two games above is made clear in the following theorem, the proof of which follows in the
footsteps of [10] and is given in Appendix I.
Theorem 1: Let P ∗(h) and J∗(h) denote the Nash equilibrium solutions of the game described by (3) and (4). Then the
original game of (1), (2) has a Nash equilibrium point, which is given by the following pair of strategies:
P̂ (hm) =
{
P ∗(hm) if h ∈ U(R,P ,J )
Pa(hm) if h /∈ U(R,P ,J ) (7)
Ĵ(hm) =
{
Ja(hm) if h ∈ U(R,P ,J )
J∗(hm) if h /∈ U(R,P ,J ) (8)
where U(R,P ,J ) = {h ∈ RM+ : IM (h, P ∗(h), J∗(h)) ≥ R}, and where Pa(h) and Ja(h) are some arbitrary power
allocations satisfying the power constraints respectively.
III. CSI AVAILABLE TO ALL PARTIES. JAMMING GAME WITH LONG-TERM POWER CONSTRAINTS: PURE STRATEGIES
The long-term power constrained jamming game can be formulated as:
Tx
{
Minimize Pr(IM (h, {Pm}, {Jm}) < R)
Subject to E[PM (h)] ≤ P (9)
Jx
{
Maximize Pr(IM (h, {Pm}, {Jm}) < R)
Subject to E[JM (h)] ≤ J (10)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the vector of channel coefficients h = (h0, h1, . . . , hM−1) ∈ RM+ , and P and
J are the upper-bounds on average transmission power of the source and jammer, respectively.
Contrary to the previous short-term power constraints scenario, if long-term power constraints are used it is possible to have
PM (h) > P for a particular channel realization h, as long as the average of PM (h) over all possible channel realizations is
less than P .
Let m denote the probability measure introduced by the probability density function (p.d.f.) of h, i.e., for a set A ⊆ RM+ ,
we have m(A ) =
∫
A
f(h)dh. Integrating with respect to this measure is equivalent to computing an average with respect to
the p.d.f. given by f(h), i.e., dm(h) = f(h)dh.
Both transmitter and jammer have to plan in terms of power allocation, considering both the instantaneous realization and
the probability distribution of the channel coefficient vector, as well as their opponent’s strategy.
If the number of blocks M in each frame is larger than 1, the game between transmitter and jammer has two levels. The
first (coarser) level is about power allocation between frames, and has the probability of outage as a cost/reward function. This
is the only level that shows up in the case of M = 1. The second (finer) level is that of power allocation between the blocks
within a frame.
An important comment similar to that in [1] needs to be made. We should point out that decomposing the problem into
several (two or three) levels of power control, each of which is solved separately, does not restrict the generality of our solution.
In proving our main results we take a contradictory approach. That is, instead of directly deriving each optimal strategy, we
assume an optimal solution has already been reached and show it has to satisfy a set of properties. We do this by first assuming
that the properties are not satisfied, and then showing that under this assumption at least one of the players can improve its
strategy (and hence the original solution cannot be optimal). The properties are selected such that they are not only necessary,
but also sufficient for the completely characterizing the optimal solution (i.e. there exists a unique pair of strategies that satisfy
these properties).
5A. Power Allocation between the blocks in a Frame
In this subsection we only deal with the second (intra-frame) level of power allocation for the maximin and minimax
problems. The first (inter-frame) level will be investigated in detail in the following two subsections.
The probability of outage is determined by the m-measure of the set over which the transmitter is not present or the jammer
is successful in inducing outage. This set is established in the first level of power control. Note that the first level power
allocation strategies cannot be derived before the second level strategies are available.
In the maximin case (when the jammer plays first), assume that the jammer has already allocated some power JM to a
given frame. Naturally, the transmitter knows JM (the maximin problem assumes that the transmitter is fully aware of the
jammer’s strategy). Depending on the channel realization, the value of JM , and its own power constraints, the transmitter
decides whether it wants to achieve reliable communication over that frame. If it decides to transmit, it needs to spend as little
power as possible (the transmitter will be able to use the saved power for achieving reliable communication over another set
of positive m-measure, and thus to decrease the probability of outage). Therefore, the transmitter’s objective is to minimize
the power PM spent for achieving reliable communication. The transmitter will adopt this strategy whether the jammer is
present over the frame, or not. The jammer’s objective is then to allocate JM between the blocks such that the required PM
is maximized.
In the minimax scenario (when transmitter plays first) the jammer’s objective is to minimize the power JM used for jamming
the transmission over a given frame. The jammer will only transmit if the transmitter is present with some PM . The transmitter’s
objective is to distribute PM between blocks such that the power required for jamming is maximized.
The two problems can be formulated as:
Problem 1 (for the maximin solution - jammer plays first)
max
{Jm≥0}
[
min
{Pm≥0}
PM =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
Pm,
s.t. IM ({Pm}, {Jm}) ≥ R
]
s.t.
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
Jm ≤ JM ; (11)
Problem 2 (for the minimax solution - transmitter plays first)
max
{Pm≥0}
[
min
{Jm≥0}
JM =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
Jm,
s.t. IM ({Pm}, {Jm}) ≤ R
]
s.t.
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
Pm ≤ PM . (12)
These problems can be solved by methods very similar to those presented in the first part of this paper [1]. For the brevity of
this presentation, we shall only point out the main results, and defer all proofs to the Appendix II. The following propositions
fully characterize the solutions.
Proposition 2: The optimal solution of either of the two problems above satisfies both constraints with equality.
Proposition 3: (I) Take the game given by (3) and (4) and set the constraints to PM (h) ≤ PM,1 and JM (h) ≤ JM,1.
Denote the resulting value of the objective by IM (h, P (h), J(h)) = R1. Then solving Problem 1 above with the constraints
1
M
∑M−1
m=0 Jm ≤ JM,1 and IM ({Pm}, {Jm}) ≥ R1 yields the objective PM = PM,1. Moreover, any pair of power allocations
across blocks that makes an optimal solution of the game in (3) and (4) is also an optimal solution of Problem 1, and conversely.
(II)Take the game given by (3) and (4) and set the constraints to PM (h) ≤ PM,1 and JM (h) ≤ JM,1. Denote the resulting
value of the objective by IM (h, P (h), J(h)) = R1. Then solving Problem 2 above with the constraints 1M
∑M−1
m=0 Pm ≤ PM,1
and IM ({Pm}, {Jm}) ≤ R1 yields the objective JM = JM,1. Moreover, any pair of power allocations across blocks that
makes an optimal solution of the game in (3) and (4) is also an optimal solution of Problem 2, and conversely.
(III) If JM,1 is the value used for the second constraint in Problem 1 above, and PM,1 is the resulting value of the cost/reward
function, then solving Problem 2 with PM = PM,1 yields the cost/reward function JM = JM,1. Moreover, any pair of power
allocations across blocks that makes an optimal solution of Problem 1, should also make an optimal solution of Problem 2,
and conversely.
Proposition 4: The optimal solutions of Problem 1 and Problem 2 above are unique.
Proposition 5: (I) Under the optimal maximin second level power control strategies (Problem 1), the “required” transmitter
power PM over a frame is a strictly increasing, continuous, concave and unbounded function of the power JM that the jammer
invests in that frame.
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Fig. 3. Typical PM (JM ) curves, for different channel realizations
(II) Under the optimal minimax second level power control strategies (Problem 2), the “required” jamming power JM over
a frame is a strictly increasing, continuous, convex and unbounded function of the power PM that the transmitter invests in
that frame.
Although under the same transmitter/jammer frame power constraints PM and JM the second level optimal power allocation
strategies for the maximin and minimax problems coincide, this result should not be associated with the notion of Nash
equilibrium, since the two problems solved above do not form a zero-sum game, while for the game of (9) and (10), first level
power control strategies are yet to be investigated.
As in [1], we shall henceforth denote the function that gives the “required” transmitter power PM over a frame where the
jammer invests power JM by PM (JM ,h) and its “inverse”, i.e. the function that gives the “required” jamming power over a
frame where the transmitter invests PM by JM (PM ,h). Note that unlike in [1], these functions are now also dependent on
the channel realization h. A particular channel realization can be characterized in terms of the second level power allocation
technique. For instance, considering the maximin problem, we can map each channel vector h to a unique curve PM (JM )
in the plane. That is, for fixed h, we increase the jamming power allocated to the frame from 0 to ∞, and compute the
transmitter power PM (JM ,h) required for achieving reliable communication. We have already mentioned that, for any fixed
h, PM (JM ) is a strictly increasing, continuous, concave and unbounded function.
Next we take a closer look at the PM (JM ,h) curves. By inspecting the proofs of Propositions 2 - 5, we notice that j
denotes the index of the first block on which the jammer allocates nonzero power, while p is the index of the first block on
which the transmitter allocates nonzero power (the blocks are indexed in increasing order of their squared channel coefficients
hm, and both transmitter and jammer allocate more power to blocks with larger values of hm). Note also that p ≤ j. If for a
given h we have p = j over an interval of JM , then the PM (JM ) curve is linear over that interval. However, if p < j, the
curve is strictly concave.
We can think of the PM (JM ) curve that characterizes a given channel realization h as being “built” in the following manner.
We increase the jamming power allocated to the corresponding frame, starting from JM = 0. We already know that without
the jammer’s presence the transmitter transmits over the “best” blocks , i.e. the ones having the largest channel coefficients.
Even as the jammer starts interfering, its optimal strategy is such that the blocks with the largest coefficients remain the most
attractive for the transmitter. However, they do become worse than before. Hence, if without the presence of the jammer the
transmitter would normally ignore some of the blocks, as the jammer’s power increases, those blocks may slowly become
more attractive. At some point, the transmitter will choose to increase the number of blocks over which it allocates non-zero
power (i.e. decrease p). Similarly, as the jammer’s power JM increases, the jammer moves from the best block to the best two
blocks, and so on (i.e. the jammer decreases j).
The transmitter’s and the jammer’s transitions do not have to be simultaneous. Recall that the relationship between the values
of p and j decide whether the PM (JM ) curve is linear or strictly concave over an interval of JM . Therefore, we expect the
PM (JM ) curves to look like a concatenation of linear and strictly concave segments, as in Figure 3. As JM increases, the
transmitter decreases the value of p whenever the slope of the PM (JM ) curve can be decreased by this move and similarly,
the jammer decreases the value of j whenever the slope can be increased. In other words, as JM increases, the transitions
from linear portions to nonlinear portions are caused by the transmitter, while the transitions from nonlinear to linear ones are
caused by the jammer.
In the remainder of this subsection we provide the simplest example of optimal power allocation between the blocks of a
7frame. Namely, we look at the case when M = 2 – only two blocks per frame.
Particular case: M = 2
The case of M = 2 is the simplest and most intuitive illustration of the second-level power control strategy. Since we have
already discussed the nice dual property between the second level minimax and maximin strategies, the following considerations
refer to the maximin scenario only. The jamming power JM has to be allocated between the two blocks in a way that maximizes
the transmitter’s expense, should it decide to achieve reliable communication over the frame. The jammer and the transmitter
can each transmit over either one or both blocks. All possible situations are considered next.
Let the two channel coefficients be h0 ≤ h1, and denote the transmitter’s and jammer’s powers allocated to the blocks by
P0, P1 and J0, J1 respectively. Also denote xi = Ji + σ2N , for i ∈ {0, 1}, and c = exp(2R). If we take a closer look at the
solutions (5) and (6) of the game in (3) and (4), and if we recall that the solutions of either of our maximin and minimax
second layer power allocation strategies have a similar form (up to the constants η and ν), it is easy to observe that x0 ≤ x1
and x0h0 ≥
x1
h1
. This fact is also noted in Appendix II-C, where the solution of Problem 1 is given again, with the new notation
λ = 1/η and µ = ν/η. Throughout the rest of this subsection we shall refer to the notation in Appendix II-C and the solution
in (100) and (101).
If the transmitter is active over both blocks, then the constraint IM = R yields(
1 +
h0
x0
P0
)(
1 +
h1
x1
P1
)
= c, (13)
and with (102) in Appendix II-C we obtain λ =
√
cx0h0
x1
h1
.
Suppose that the jammer is only present on one block of the frame, then that is the block with coefficient h1. This implies
x0 = σ
2
N , and x1 = (2JM + σ2N ). Under these assumptions, the transmitter will only transmit on the first block, (that is
P0 = 2PM and P1 = 0) if and only if
λ =
√
c
x0
h0
x1
h1
<
x0
h0
, (14)
which translates to c (2JM+σ
2
N )
h1
<
σ2N
h0
.
Otherwise, the transmitter is present over both blocks, performing water-pouring as in (102), with
λ =
√
c
(2JM + σ2N )σ
2
N
h0h1
. (15)
Note that the transmitter cannot be present only on the second block.
If the jammer decides to allocate non-zero power over both blocks, its optimal strategy is such that x0/h0 ≥ x1/h1. If we
also have x0/h0 ≤ c(x1/h1) (corresponding to λ ≥ x0/h0), then the transmitter is present over both blocks. In this case, we
can particularize (102) to M = 2 and obtain:
Pm =
√
c
x0
h0
x1
h1
− xm
hm
, for m ∈ {0, 1}. (16)
Define the ratio r = x0/h0x1/h1 . Since x0 + x1 = 2(JM + σ
2
N ), we can write
PM =
(JM + σ
2
N )(2
√
cr − r − 1)
h0r + h1
, if cx1
h1
≥ x0
h0
. (17)
Setting the derivative of PM with respect to r equal to zero, we get the unique solution
ropt =
(√
(h1 − h0)2 + 4h0h1c− (h1 − h0)
2h0
√
c
)2
, (18)
which provides the optimal allocation of the jamming power JM between the two blocks. The value of ropt is between 1 (for
h0 = h1) and c (for h0 = 0). Furthermore, PM (r) is strictly increasing for r ∈ [1, ropt) and strictly decreasing for r ∈ (ropt, c],
hence ropt is the maximizing argument in (17).
This also implies that if ropt (2JM+σ
2
N )
h1
<
σ2N
h1
, the jammer’s optimal strategy is to allocate all of its power to the second
block. If, on the other hand, ropt (2JM+σ
2
N )
h1
≥ σ2Nh1 , then the jammer’s best strategy is to allocate the power JM such that the
ratio r = (x0/h0)/(x1/h1) equals the optimal ratio ropt.
The remarks above conclude in the following algorithm:
• If c (2JM+σ
2
N )
h1
≤ σ2Nh0 , both transmitter and jammer will only transmit on the second block.
• If c (2JM+σ
2
N )
h1
>
σ2N
h0
but ropt (2JM+σ
2
N )
h1
≤ σ2Nh1 , the jammer will allocate all its power to the second block, while the
transmitter will transmit on both blocks.
8• If ropt (2JM+σ
2
N )
h1
>
σ2N
h1
, the jammer will transmit over both blocks such that (x0/h0)/(x1/h1) = ropt, and the transmitter
will also be present on both blocks.
B. Inter-Frame Power Allocation
In this subsection we present the first level optimal power allocation strategies.
The Maximin Solution
Under our full CSI, average power constraints scenario, the jammer needs to find the best choice of the set X ⊂ RM+ of
channel realizations over which it should be present, and the optimal way JM (h) to distribute its power over X , such that
when the transmitter employs its optimal strategy, the probability of outage is maximized.
We already know that given the jammer’s strategy, the optimal way of allocating the transmitter’s power is such that reliable
communication is first obtained on the frames that require the least amount of transmitter power. The jammer’s optimal strategy
is presented in Theorem 2 below. The theorem is complemented by the numerical algorithm and the intuition-building analogy
that follows its proof.
Theorem 2: It is optimal for the jammer to make JM (h) satisfy the power constraint with equality. The optimal jammer
strategy for allocating power across frames is to increase the required transmitter power, starting with those frames whose
channel realizations exhibit the steepest instantaneous slope of the characteristic PM (JM ) curve. The jamming power should
be allocated such that the required transmitter power over each channel realization where the jammer is present does not exceed
a pre-defined level K .
The optimal value for K that maximizes the outage probability can be found numerically, by exhaustive search in a compact
interval of the positive real line.
Proof: Our proof takes a contradictory approach. Instead of deriving the optimal strategy defined above in a direct manner,
we show instead that any other strategy not satisfying the theorem’s requirements is suboptimal. Let S ,X ⊂ RM+ denote the
sets of channel realizations over which the transmitter and the jammer are present, respectively.
Suppose the jammer picks a certain strategy JM (h). Since the transmitter’s strategy is predictable, the jammer already knows
the transmitter’s optimal strategy. Under this optimal strategy, the transmitter picks a set of frames S over which it will invest
non-zero power. This choice also results in a maximum level of required transmitter power that will actually be matched by
the transmitter. Denote this level by K .
Since the transmitter’s strategy is the optimal response to the jammer’s strategy, the required transmitter power should be
larger than or equal to K over the set of frames X \S where the jammer jams, but the transmitter does not afford to transmit.
Otherwise, the transmitter would be wasting power and its strategy would not be optimal.
But since the jammer knows the transmitter’s strategy, and knows that the transmitter will not transmit over X \ S , its
optimal strategy should make the required transmitter power over X \S at most equal to K . Otherwise the jammer would
be wasting power.
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Fig. 4. Maximin vase filling.
9We have seen how the jammer’s power should be distributed over X \S . Next we show that if the jammer’s power allocation
over S
⋂
X is not done according to the theorem, the jammer’s strategy is not optimal. For this, we assume that the jammer’s
strategy does not satisfy the theorem’s requirements, and provide a method of improvement (i.e. we prove sub-optimality).
If the theorem is not satisfied, than there exist two sets A ,B ⊂ S ⋂X of non-zero m-measure such thatdPM(h1)dJM >
dPM (h2)
dJM
∀ h1 ∈ A and h2 ∈ B, and such that the required PM is less than K on A and JM > 0 on B.
Consider a small enough amount of jamming power δJM , such that, for any channel realization h ∈ A ⋃B, we can modify
the jamming power by δJM without changing the slope of the PM (JM ) curve. Subtracting δJM from all frames in B, the
jammer obtains the excess power δJMm(B), which it can allocate uniformly over A . The jammer’s total average power
remains unchanged. However, the required transmitter power over A
⋃
B is increased (because the slopes of the PM (JM )
curves corresponding to A are all larger than the slopes of the PM (JM ) curves corresponding to B), and thus the modification
results in a larger probability of outage.
There exists a closed interval [0,Kmax] ∈ R+ which includes the optimal value of K . This observation is vital to the
existence of a numerical algorithm that searches for the optimal K . Once such an interval has been set, we can fix the desired
resolution and calculate the numerical complexity of the algorithm. We next show how the upper limit Kmax of this interval
can be found. Consider the set of channel realizations S0 where the transmitter is active when the jammer does not interfere
with the transmission. Next, find the value Kmax for which, when the jammer allocates its power J according to the rules of
the theorem, we obtain a set X0 ⊂ RM+ \S0. This means that the jammer’s strategy under any K ≥ Kmax has no influence
upon the transmitter’s strategy. Note that such a finite Kmax can be found whenever RM+ \S0 has non-zero m-measure.
The algorithm in Table I which we used in generating our numerical results in Subsection III-C helps shed more light
into the practicality of Theorem 2. In the description of the algorithm, we assume discrete jamming power levels JkM with
k = 0, 1, . . . and J0M = 0, as well as a discrete and finite channel coefficient space. As a consequence, there exists a finite
number of PM (JM ) curves, each characterizing one possible channel realization, and each completely determined by a finite
vector whose components are the values of PM (JkM ) for that particular channel realization.
An intuitive description of the technique is given in Figure 4. Consider the problem where the jammer has to pour water
in a number of vases (a vase for each possible channel realization). The shape of each vase is such that the vertical section
of its wall produces a concave curve similar to the corresponding PM (JM ) curve. The jammer can afford to spend a certain
volume of water. The jammer wants to “annoy” the transmitter, which is deeply concerned with the sum of the heights that the
water levels reach in the vases. Hence, the jammer tries to use its available volume of water, such that the sum of the water
levels’ heights is maximized. However, the jammer cannot pour all the water in the thinnest vase, because then the transmitter
might just ignore that vase. Instead, the jammer has to set a height limit K which it should not exceed. The jammer pours
the water a cup at a time, starting with the vase in which a cup of water rises the water level the quickest. In Figure 4, the
order of adding cups to the vases is shown by numerals from 1 to 11. The first cup is poured into the thinnest vase (vase A)
and incidentally reaches the level K . Thus, no more water should be added to vase A. The next three cups are added to vase
B, and then the next five cups to vase C. Then the jammer returns to vase B, and adds another cup, for this increases the
water level more than it would increase the level in vase C. Finally, the last available cup is added to vase C. The way the
numerical algorithm works is illustrated in the right part of Figure 4.
The Minimax Solution
In Theorem 3 we showed that given the transmitter’s and the jammer’s powers PM and JM allocated to a frame, the optimal
strategies for distributing these powers inside the frame are identical for the minimax and the maximin problems. Hence, by
rotating the PM (JM ) plane, we get the characteristic JM (PM ) curves for the minimax problem.
We already know that given the transmitter’s strategy, the optimal way of allocating the jammer’s power is such that outage
is first induced on the frames that require the least amount of jamming power.
The transmitter’s optimal strategy is presented in the following theorem, which is complemented by the numerical algorithm
and the analogy that follows its proof.
Theorem 3: It is optimal for transmitter to make PM (h) satisfy the long-term power constraint with equality. The optimal
transmitter power allocation across frames is to increase the required jamming power up to some pre-defined level K , starting
with those frames on which the required transmitter power to achieve this goal is least.
The optimal value for K that minimizes the outage probability can be found numerically by exhaustive search.
Proof: As in the case of Theorem 2, we take a contradictory approach. Instead of directly deriving the optimal strategy
defined above, we show that any other strategy not satisfying the theorem’s requirements is suboptimal. Recall that S and X ⊂
R
M
+ denote the sets of channel realizations over which the transmitter and the jammer are present, respectively.
Suppose the transmitter picks a certain strategy PM (h). Since the jammer’s strategy is predictable, the transmitter already
knows the jammer’s optimal strategy. Under this optimal strategy, the jammer should pick a set of frames X over which it will
invest non-zero power. This choice also results in a maximum level of required jamming power that will actually be matched
by the jammer. Denote this level by K .
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TABLE I
NUMERICAL ALGORITHM FOR DERIVING THE MAXIMIN SOLUTION.
Let P denote a matrix with each row representing one of the
vectors PM (JkM ), for different channel realizations h. Let
Preq be the vector of required powers for the different frames.
The initial Preq is set equal to the first column of P. Let
Kmax be the upper limit when searching for the optimal K.
Initialize K = 0.
while K ≤ Kmax
pT = 0.
Let L be an index vector, the same size as Preq .
Initialize all components of L to be equal to 1.
We have the relationship Preq(j) = P(j, L(j)).
% Jx strategy:
The amount of jamming power spent at each step is accumu-
lated into the variable Jc.
while Jx power constraint is satisfied (Jc ≤ J )
Find row j of P with the largest difference
between components L(j) + 1 and L(j),
and such that P(j, L(j) + 1) ≤ K.
Preq(j) = P(j, L(j) + 1).
L(j) = L(j) + 1.
Weigh JjM by probability of row j and add to Jc.
end
% Tx strategy (Tx picks frames where required power is
minimum first)
The amount of transmitter power spent at each step is simu-
lated into the variable Pc.
while Tx power constraint is satisfied (Pc ≤ P)
Pick the least component of Preq .
Add probability of corresponding frame to pT .
Add value of component, weighted by
probability above, to Pc.
Delete component from Preq .
end
Pout(K) = 1− pT
Increment K.
end
Select K that produces the largest Pout.
Since the jammer’s strategy is optimal, the required jamming power outside the set X should be larger than or equal to K .
Otherwise, the jammer would be wasting power and hence its strategy would not be optimal.
But since the transmitter knows the jammer’s strategy, it also knows that the jammer will not be present over S \X , so
the transmitter should make the required jamming power over S \X at most equal to K . Otherwise the transmitter would
be wasting power. Hence, over S \X the transmitter should allocate power such that the required jamming power is equal
to K .
Next we show that if the transmitter’s power allocation over S
⋂
X is not done according to the theorem, the transmitter’s
strategy is not optimal. For this, we assume that the transmitter’s strategy does not satisfy the theorem’s requirements, and
provide a method of improvement (i.e. we prove sub-optimality).
If the theorem is not satisfied, than there exist two sets A ,B ⊂ S ⋂X of non-zero m-measure such that PM (h1,K) <
PM (h2,K) ∀ h1 ∈ A and h2 ∈ B, and such that the required JM is less than K on A and JM > 0 on B cannot be part
of the minimax solution. Denote the original transmitter power allocation functions over A and B by PAM,0(h) and PBM,0(h)
respectively.
For any h1 ∈ A , h2 ∈ B and JM,1, JM,2 < K , we have:
K − JM,1
PM (h1,K)− PM (h1, JM,1)
a)
≥ K
PM (h1,K)
>
b)
>
K
PM (h2,K)
c)
≥ JM,2
PM (h2, JM,2)
, (19)
where both a) and c) follow from the convexity of JM (PM ) – Proposition 5 – and b) follows from the assumption in the
beginning of this proof.
If the transmitter cuts off transmission over a subset B′ ⊂ B, it obtains the excess power ∫
B′
PM (h)dm(h), which it can
11
allocate to a subset A ′ ⊂ A such that the required JM is equal to K over A ′, i.e.∫
B′
PBM,0(h)dm(h) =
∫
A ′
[
PM (h,K)− PAM,0(h)
]
dm(h) (20)
Replacing PM (h1, JM,1) by PAM,0(h) and PM (h2, JM,2) by PBM,0(h) in (19), we see the transmitter improves its strategy
by forcing the jammer to allocate more power to the set A ⋃B, and hence decreases the probability of outage. Note that
since B′ ⊂ S ⋂X , the set B′ is in outage, regardless of whether the transmitter is present or not. Thus, transmitter does
not increase Pout by cutting off transmission on B′.
There exists a closed interval [0,Kmax] ∈ R+ which includes the optimal value of K . As in the maximin case, the existence
of such a closed interval is required for constructing a numerical algorithm that searches for the optimal K . The upper limit
Kmax of this interval can be found and updated as follows. First solve the problem for an arbitrarily chosen K0, and determine
the set S0 \X0 over which the transmitter achieves reliable communication. We can set Kmax equal to the value of K that
yields a set S of the same m-measure as the set S0 \X0. Note that if K is increased over this Kmax, the outage probability
is at least as large as that obtained for K = K0 (and hence K0 is a better choice).
The algorithm in Table II which we used for our numerical results in Subsection III-C illustrates the application of Theorem
3. In the description of the algorithm, we assume discrete jamming power levels JkM with k = 0, 1, . . . and J0M = 0, as well
as a discrete and finite channel coefficient space. As a consequence, there exists a finite number of PM (JM ) curves, each
characterizing one possible channel realization, and each completely determined by a finite vector whose components are the
values of PM (JkM ) for that particular channel realization.
A description of the technique is given in Figure 5, using the same vase analogy as in the maximin case. This time, the
transmitter does the pouring. Its obsession with the sum of the heights of the water levels imposes a constraint on this sum.
Under this constraint, the transmitter wants to use as much of the jammer’s water as possible. That is, the transmitter attempts
to maximize the volume of water that can be accommodated by the vases, under the constraint that the sum of the water levels’
heights is less than some given value. Moreover, if the transmitter pours water only in the thickest vase, it might not feel that
it did enough damage to the jammer. Thus, the transmitter needs to set a limit K . The optimal strategy is to fill (up to volume
level K) the thickest vase first (note that “thickest” refers to the fact that when filled up to volume level K , the vase displays
the lowest water level height, thus “thickest” is defined with respect to K). The order in which the transmitter adds cups of
water to the vases is depicted in Figure 5 by numerals from 1 to 12. The way the numerical algorithm works is illustrated in
the right part of Figure 5.
Particular case: M = 1
For this simple scenario, there is no second level of power allocation. All frames consist of only one block, and the PM (JM )
curves have the particular affine form with parameter h (the squared channel coefficient corresponding to this block):
PM =
exp(R)− 1
h
(JM + σ
2
N ). (21)
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Fig. 5. Minimax vase filling.
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TABLE II
NUMERICAL ALGORITHM FOR DERIVING THE MINIMAX SOLUTION.
Let P denote the matrix with rows representing the PM (JkM )
vectors for different channel realizations h. Let Kmax be value
where searching for the optimal K stops.
Initialize K = 0.
while K ≤ Kmax
% Tx strategy:
The amount of transmitter power spent at each step is accu-
mulated into the variable Pc.
Initialize K = JkM .
Initialize Pc = 0, pT = 0.
while Tx power constraint is satisfied (Pc ≤ P)
Find row j of P with least k-th component.
Add probability of row j to pT .
Add value of the k-th component, weighted
by the probability above, to Pc.
Delete row j from matrix P.
end
% Jx strategy (Jx jams frames where Tx is present, randomly,
until it reaches its power constraints):
pJ =
J
K
.
Pout(K) = pT − pJ .
Increment K.
end
Select K that produces the least Pout.
Since the slopes of the PM (JM ) curves are constant with JM and the frames with smaller values of the channel coefficients
have larger characteristic slopes, we can easily particularize Theorems 2 and 3.
With the same notation X ⊂ R+ for the set of channel realizations over which the jammer invests non-zero power and
S ⊂ R+ for the set of channel realizations over which the transmitter uses non-zero power, we can now define the optimal
power allocation strategies.
For the maximin scenario, The jammer should deploy some JM (h) over X such that the required PM (h) is constant over
the whole interval X . The purpose of the jammer being active over X \S is to ”intimidate” the transmitter. The transmitter
plays second, and hence takes advantage of the jammer’s weaknesses. It always chooses to be active on the subset of X on
which the required PM (h) is least. This is why the optimal jammer strategy is to display no weakness, i.e. to make PM (h)
constant over X . These considerations are formalized in Proposition 6 below.
Proposition 6: In the maximin scenario, the jammer should adopt such a strategy as to make the transmitter’s best choice
of S intersect X on the the left-most part of S , and the required transmitter power equal to some constant K on X
⋂
S
and to (c− 1)σ2N/h on S \X .
Transmitting JM (h), satisfying the power constraint with equality, such that the transmitter power required for reliable
communication is PM (h) = K, ∀h ∈ [h∗1, h∗2], and PM (h) = (c − 1)σ2N/h, ∀h ∈ [0,∞) \ (h∗1, h∗2], for some h∗1 < h∗2 ∈ R+
and some constant K ∈ R+
⋃{∞} is an optimal jammer strategy for the maximin problem. (Note that PM (h) should be
continuous at h∗1.)
The values K, h∗1 and h∗2 that maximize the outage probability can be found by solving the following problem:
Find min
K
∫ ∞
h0
f(h)dh, where
h0 is given by
∫ h2
h0
Kf(h)dh+
∫ ∞
h2
c− 1
h
σ2Nf(h)dh = P , (22)
h1 is given by h1 =
c− 1
K
σ2N , (23)
and h2 is given by
∫ h2
h1
(
hK
c− 1 − σ
2
N
)
f(h)dh = J . (24)

The power allocation is depicted in Figure 6. The convex decreasing curve represents the original required transmitter power,
without the presence of a jammer and satisfies the equation PM = (c − 1)σ2N/h. Notice how by picking some K , we can
determine h1, h2 and h0 (in this order), and then find the probability of outage as Pout(h1) = 1 − m[(h0,∞)]. The optimal
K , resulting in h∗1, h∗2 and h∗0, is the one minimizing the m-measure of the set (h0,∞).
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Fig. 6. Maximin solution for M = 1 - power distribution between frames
For the minimax scenario the jammer will not transmit any power over a frame if outage is not going to be induced or if the
transmitter is not present, i.e. X ⊂ S . The jammer will start allocating power to the frames over which an outage is easiest
to induce, and go on with this technique until the average power reaches the limit set by its power constraint. Obviously, the
jammer prefers the frames for which the required JM (h) is less. The optimal transmitter’s strategy is to allocate its power
such that the required JM (h) is constant on the whole set S , and hence to display no weakness.
These considerations are formalized in Proposition 7 below.
Proposition 7: For the minimax scenario, the transmitter’s optimal way to allocate its power is to make the required jamming
power remain equal to some constant K on all of X . Transmitting PM (h), satisfying the power constraint with equality, such
that the required JM (h) equals K for h ∈ [h∗x,∞), and JM (h) = 0 ∀h ∈ [0, h∗x), for some h∗x ∈ R+, is an optimal transmitter
strategy for the minimax problem. The values K and h∗x that minimize the outage probability can be found by solving the
following problem numerically:
Find max
K
∫ ∞
h0
f(h)dh, where
h0 is given by
∫ h0
hx
Kf(h)dh = J , (25)
hx is given by
∫ ∞
hx
(c− 1)(K + σ2N )
h
f(h)dh = P . (26)

The numerical problem is described in Figure 7. Notice how by picking some K , we can determine hx and h0 (in this
order), and then find the probability of outage as Pout(h1) = 1 − m[(h0,∞)]. The optimal K , resulting in h∗x and h∗0, is the
one maximizing the m-measure of the set (h0,∞). Note that the jammer does not necessarily have to jam on an interval of the
form [hx, h0]. The jammer’s choice space (the set of frames out of which the jammer picks its set X ) is an indifferent one,
i.e. the jammer can randomly pick X ⊂ [hx,∞) as long as its measure satisfies Km(X ) = J . However, for the purpose of
computing the outage probability, the representation of X as an interval is convenient and incurs no loss of generality.
C. Numerical Results
We have computed the outage probabilities for both minimax and maximin problems when M = 1 and M = 2. The channel
coefficients are assumed i.i.d. exponentially distributed with parameter λ = 1/6. Figure 8 shows the outage probability vs. the
14
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Fig. 7. Minimax solution for M = 1 - power distribution between frames
maximum allowable average transmitter power P for fixed J = 10 when R = 1.
For comparison purposes, we also plotted the results for the case when M =∞, which are readily available from Part I of
this paper [1].
Numerical results demonstrate a sharp difference between the minimax solutions and the maxmin solutions, which demon-
strates the non-existence of Nash-equilibria of pure strategies for our two-person zero-sum game with full CSI.
Note the behavior of the outage probability when the number of blocks per frame M is increased. At low transmitter powers,
the increase of M produces an increase in the outage probability for both the minimax, and the maximin scenarios.
On the contrary, at higher transmitter powers a lower outage probability is obtained for both the minimax and the maximin
cases when M is larger. This behavior can be summarized as follows: the more powerful player will use the available diversity
to its own advantage.
IV. CSI AVAILABLE TO ALL PARTIES. JAMMING GAME WITH LONG-TERM POWER CONSTRAINTS: MIXED STRATEGIES
We have already seen that the maximin and minimax solutions of the jamming game when only pure strategies are allowed
do not agree, and thus our game has no Nash equilibrium of pure strategies. However, recall that the solution of the minimax
problem with pure strategies can often be a good characterization of a practical jamming situation (e.g. when the jammer does
not transmit unless it senses that the transmitter is on) and can always serve as a lower bound on the system’s performance.
This aside, a Nash equilibrium is still the preferred characterization of jamming games, and since such an equilibrium exists
for our problem only when mixed strategies are allowed, the current section is dedicated to the derivation of such a saddlepoint.
Unlike the fast fading scenario of [1], the frames in our slow-fading parallel-channels model are not equivalent. Each frame
is characterized by a different realization of the channel vector h. This is why our present scenario is even more involved than
the one in [1], and requires three levels of power control instead of two.
As before, our approach to the problem is a contradictory one. We study the power control levels starting with the “finest”
one, and show that if our conditions for power allocations are not satisfied, then the strategy is suboptimal. The reason why
an additional (third) level of power control appears here is a combination of the facts that we study mixed strategies and
the frames are not all equivalent as in [1]. Namely, to cover all possible probabilistic strategies, we need to dedicate a level
of power control to the power allocation between frames with the same channel realizations (i.e. equivalent frames) and an
additional level of power control for the power allocation between frames with different channel realizations. Along with the
power allocation within frames, these problems cover all possible cases.
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A. Power allocation within a frame
The third level of power control deals with the optimal power allocation between the blocks in a frame, once the transmitter
is given the channel vector h characterizing the frame and allocated power PM , and the jammer is given the channel vector
and its allocated power JM .
At this point, the third level of power control resembles the two-player, zero-sum game of (3) and (4) having the mutual
information calculated over a frame IM as cost function. However, none of the players knows the other player’s constraints,
because (PM , JM ) is a random event. Theorem 4 below provides the optimal transmitter/jammer strategies for power allocation
within a frame.
Theorem 4: Given a frame with channel vector h and a realization (pM , jM ) of (PM , JM ), let PM (jM ) denote the solution
of Problem 1 in Section III with JM = jM , and JM (pM ) denote the solution of Problem 2 in Section III with PM = pM .
The transmitter’s optimal strategy is the solution of the game in (3) and (4), where the jammer is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Jm ≤
JM (pM ) and the transmitter is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤ pM . The jammer’s optimal strategy is the solution of the
game in (3) and (4), where the transmitter is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤ PM (jM ) and the jammer is constrained to
1
M
∑M−1
m=1 Jm ≤ jM .
Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 5 of [1] and is deferred to Appendix III
B. Power allocation between frames with the same channel vector
Due to the form of the optimal second level power allocation strategies described in the previous subsection, the probability
that a given frame is in outage can be expressed as
Pout,h = Pr{JM ≥ JM (PM )} =
= 1− Pr{PM ≥ PM (JM )}, (27)
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where PM (jM ) is the strictly increasing, unbounded and concave function (see Proposition 5) that characterizes the frame.
Note that a pair of strategies can only be optimal if Pout,h above is the Nash equilibrium of a jamming game played over the
frames characterized by the same channel vector h. This means that if the transmitter and jammer decide to allocate powers
PM,h and JM,h respectively to frames with channel vector h, they should not allocate the same amount of power to each
of these frames. Instead, they should use power levels given by the realizations of two random variables PM and JM with
distribution functions (FP (pM ), FJ (jM )) given in the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The unique Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies of the two-player, zero-sum game with average power
constraints described by
min
FP (pM ):EFP PM≤PM (h)
max
FJ (jM ):EFJ JM≤JM (h)
Pout,h, (28)
where EFP and EFJ denote expectations with respect to the distributions FP (pM ) and FJ (jM ), is attained by the pair of
strategies (FP (pM ), FJ (jM )) satisfying:
FP (PM (y)) ∼ kpU([0, 2v])(y) + (1− kp)∆0(y), (29)
FJ (JM (x)) ∼ kjU([0, JM (2v)])(x) + (1− kj)∆0(x), (30)
where U([r, t])(·) denotes the CDF of a uniform distribution over the interval [r, t], and ∆0(·) denotes the CDF of a Dirac
distribution (i.e. a step function), and the parameters kp, kj ∈ [0, 1] and v ∈ [max{JM,h,JM (PM,h)/2},∞) are uniquely
determined from the following steps:
1) Find the unique value v0 which satisfies:
PM,hJM,h = [PM (2v0)− PM,h](2v0 − JM,h). (31)
2) Compute S(v0) =
∫ 2v0
0 PM (y)dy − 2v0PM,h.
3) If S(v0) < 0, then v is the unique solution of∫ 2v
0
PM (y)dy − 2vPM,h = 0, (32)
kp = 1 (33)
and
kj =
JM,hPM (2v)
2v[PM (2v)− PM,h] . (34)
4) If S(v0) = 0 then v = v0, kp = kj = 1.
5) If S(v0) > 0, then v is the unique solution of∫ 2v
0
PM (y)dy −PM (2v)(2v − JM,h) = 0, (35)
kp =
2vPM,h
PM (2v)[2v − JM,h] (36)
and
kj = 1. (37)
Proof: The proof follows directly from Theorem 9 in Appendix III of [1], by substituting x = PM , y = JM ,
g(y) = PM (y), g−1(x) = JM (x), a = PM,h and b = JM,h. It is also interesting to note that the condition
∫ b
0
g(y)dy <∫∞
g(b)
g−1(x)dx is satisfied because PM (y) is unbounded.
Particular case: M = 1
For M = 1 the first (intra-frame) level of power control is inexistent. For a given channel realization h we can readily derive
the affine function PM (jM ) in (27) as
PM (jM ) =
c− 1
h
(jM + σ
2
N ) (38)
where c = exp(R). If we use the particularization of the general solution of Theorem 5 to affine functions, as in the last part
of Appendix III of [1], we obtain the outage probability as
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Pout,h = 1−
hPM (h)
c−1
JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2
N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N
if hPM (h)
c− 1 ≤
1
2
JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N , (39)
and
Pout,h =
1
2JM (h)
hPM (h)
c−1 − σ2N
if hPM (h)
c− 1 >
1
2
JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N . (40)
The transmitter and jammer strategies that achieve these payoffs are such that
FP (x) ∼ kpU([c− 1
h
σ2N , 2v
c− 1
h
+
c− 1
h
σ2N ])(x) +
+(1− kp)∆0(x),
FJ (y) ∼ 2v
2v + σ2N
kjU([0, 2v])(y) + (1 − 2v
2v + σ2N
kj)∆0(y).
The parameters kp, kj ∈ [0, 1] and v ∈ [max{JM (h),J ′M (PM (h))/2},∞) are uniquely determined from the following steps:
1) If
hPM (h)
c− 1 ≤
1
2
JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N , (41)
then
v =
1
2
JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 +
2σ2N
JM (h)
]
, (42)
kp =
2vPM (h)
c−1
h (2v + σ
2
N )(2v − JM (h))
(43)
and
kj = 1. (44)
2) If
hPM (h)
c− 1 >
1
2
JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N , (45)
then
v =
PM (h)− c−1h σ2N
c−1
h
, (46)
kp = 1 (47)
and
kj =
c−1
h JM (h)(2PM (h)− c−1h σ2N )
2(PM (h)− c−1h σ2N )2
. (48)
The special form of this solution will be used in the next subsection to derive the overall Nash equilibrium of the mixed
strategies game for M = 1.
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C. Power allocation between frames with different channel vectors
In the previous subsections we have described the optimal power control strategies for given particular channel realization
h, and transmitter and jammer power levels PM,h and JM,h respectively. The first level of power control,which is the subject
of this subsection, deals with allocating the powers specified by the transmitter and jammer average power constraints P and
J between different channel vectors. In other words, we are now concerned with solving the problem
min
PM (h):EhPM (h)≤P
max
JM (h):EhJM(h)≤J
Eh[
Pout,h,PM (h),JM(h)] (49)
where Pout,h,PM (h),JM(h) (also denoted as Pout,h) is the outage probability of a frame characterized by the channel vector h
and to which the transmitter allocates power PM (h), and the jammer allocates power JM (h). Note that Pout,h,PM (h),JM(h)
can be easily computed according to the second and third levels of power control already presented.
However, the Nash equilibrium of the game in (49) above is highly dependent on the result of the second level of power
control. Since finding a closed form solution for the second level is still an open problem, a general solution for the first level
of power control is not available at this time.
However, we next provide a Nash equilibrium for the particular case when M = 1.
Particular case: M = 1
We start by pointing out the following important property of the second-level power control strategies for M = 1.
Proposition 8: The outage probability Pout,h given in (39) and (40) above is a continuous function of both arguments.
Moreover, Pout,h is a strictly decreasing, convex function of PM (h) for fixed JM (h) and a strictly increasing, concave
function of JM (h) for fixed PM (h).
Proof: In the remainder of this section we shall denote the case when hPM (h)c−1 ≤ 12JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2
N
JM(h)
]
+ σ2N by
Case 1 and the case when hPM (h)c−1 >
1
2JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2
N
JM(h)
]
+ σ2N by Case 2.
It is straightforward to check that when hPM (h)c−1 =
1
2JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2
N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N we get Pout,h = 1
1+
r
1+2
σ2
N
JM (h)
by
using either of the relations in (39) or (40). Thus, the continuity of Pout,h follows immediately.
If we evaluate the derivatives for Case 1
dPout,h
dPM (h)
= −
h
c−1
JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2
N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N
(50)
and for Case 2
dPout,h
dPM (h)
= −
c−1
h JM (h)
2(PM (h)− c−1h σ2N )2
(51)
we note that when JM (h) is fixed, Pout,h is a strictly decreasing function of PM (h), affine in Case 1 and strictly convex in
Case 2. Moreover, dPout,hdPM (h) is continuous, which makes Pout,h an overall strictly decreasing, convex function of PM (h).
Similar (but symmetric) properties hold for the derivatives
dPout,h
dJM (h)
=
h
c−1
JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2
N
JM(h)
]
+ σ2N
·
· PM (h)
JM (h)
√
1 + 2
σ2
N
JM (h)
, (52)
for Case 1 and
dPout,h
dJM (h)
=
1
2
1
h
c−1PM (h)− σ2N
(53)
for Case 2, yielding Pout,h an overall strictly increasing, concave function of JM (h) (strictly concave in Case 1 and affine in
Case 2).
The result of Proposition 8 implies that the overall outage probability EhPout,h is a convex function of {PM (h)} for fixed
{JM (h)} and a concave function of {JM (h)} for fixed {PM (h)}. Since the set of strategies {PM (h), JM (h)} is convex, there
always exists a saddlepoint of the game in (49) [13]. The importance of this result should be noted, since it implies that a Nash
equilibrium of mixed strategies of the two-person, zero-sum game in (49) can be achieved by only looking for pure strategies.
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Recall that any Nash equilibrium of pure strategies is also a Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies, and that for a two-person,
zero-sum game all Nash equilibria share the same value of the cost function [12].
Any saddlepoint of (49) has to satisfy the KKT conditions associated with the maximization and minimization problems
of (49) simultaneously. The next Proposition shows these KKT conditions are not only necessary, but also sufficient for
determining a saddlepoint. The proof is deferred to Appendix III.
Proposition 9: For our two-player, zero-sum game of (49), any solution of the joint system of KKT conditions associated
with the maximization and minimization problems yields a Nash equilibrium.
We can now solve the KKT conditions associated with the maximization and minimization problems of (49) simultaneously.
For Case 1, these are
−
h
c−1
JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2
N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N
+ λ− γ(h) = 0 (54)
and
−
h
c−1
JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2
N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N
·
· PM (h)
JM (h)
√
1 + 2
σ2
N
JM (h)
+ µ− δ(h) = 0, (55)
where γ(h) and δ(h) are the complementary slackness conditions satisfying γ(h)PM (h) = 0 and δ(h)JM (h) = 0, and where
µ, λ ≥ 0. From (55) we get
PM (h) =
µ
λ
JM (h)
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
, (56)
resulting in
JM (h) =
√(λ
µ
)2
PM (h)2 + σ4N − σ2N

+
, (57)
which in combination with (54) yields
PM (h) =
[
h
c− 1
µ
2λ2
− µ(c− 1)
2h
σ4N
]
+
, (58)
where we denote [x]+ = max{x, 0}. Under this solution, the condition for being under Case 1,
hPM (h)
c− 1 ≤
1
2
JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N (59)
translates to
2µh
λ(c− 1) ≤ 1 +
√
1 + 4σ2Nµ
2
(
σ2N +
1
µ
)
=
= 2(1 + σ2Nµ). (60)
Note that PM (h) = 0 if and only if JM (h) = 0, and this happens when h ≤ h0/1, where
h0/1 = λ(c− 1)σ2N . (61)
Writing the KKT conditions for Case 2 under the assumption that PM (h), JM (h) ≥ 0 we obtain
−
h
c−1JM (h)
2
(
h
c−1PM (h)− σ2N
)2 + λ− γ(h) = 0 (62)
and
− 1
2
(
h
c−1PM (h)− σ2N
) + µ− δ(h) = 0, (63)
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which yield
JM (h) =
c− 1
h
λ
2µ2
(64)
and
PM (h) =
c− 1
h
(
1
2µ
+ σ2N
)
. (65)
Note that in this case both PM (h) and JM (h) are strictly positive for finite h. Under this solution, the condition for being
under Case 2,
hPM (h)
c− 1 >
1
2
JM (h)
[
1 +
√
1 + 2
σ2N
JM (h)
]
+ σ2N (66)
translates to
2µh
λ(c− 1) > 1 +
√
1 + 4σ2Nµ
2
h
λ(c− 1) . (67)
Forcing the right-hand side of (60) to equal the right-hand side of (67) we get the value of h which is at the boundary
between Case 1 and Case 2:
h1/2 = λ(c− 1)(
1
µ
+ σ2N ). (68)
A close inspection of the expressions of PM (h) and JM (h) for the two cases shows that they are both increasing functions of
h under Case 1 and decreasing functions of h under Case 2, and moreover, they are both continuous in h1/2. To summarize the
results above, the optimal transmitter/jammer first level power control strategies are given in (69) and (70) below, respectively.
The constants λ and µ can be obtained from the power constraints EhPM (h) = P and EhJM (h) = J .
PM (h) =

0, if h ≤ h0/1
h
c−1
µ
2λ2 − µ(c−1)2h σ2N , if h0/1 < h ≤ h1/2
c−1
h
(
1
2µ + σ
2
N
)
, if h > h1/2
(69)
JM (h) =

0, if h ≤ h0/1√(
λ
µ
)2
( hc−1
µ
2λ2 − µ(c−1)2h σ2N )2 + σ4N − σ2N , if h0/1 < h ≤ h1/2
c−1
h
λ
2µ2 , if h > h1/2
(70)
D. Numerical results
Figure 9 shows the probability of outage obtained under the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium, versus the transmitter power
constraint P , when M = 1, for a fixed rate R = 1, noise power σ2N = 10, a jammer power constraint J = 10 and a channel
coefficient distributed exponentially, with parameter λ = 1/6. The maximin and minimax solutions of the pure strategies game
are shown for comparison.
As expected, the solution of the of mixed strategies game is better (from the transmitter’s point of view) than the minimax
and worse than the maximin solutions of the pure strategies game.
V. CSI AVAILABLE RECEIVER ONLY. JAMMING GAME WITH LONG-TERM POWER CONSTRAINTS: MIXED STRATEGIES
In this section we investigate the scenario when the receiver does not feed back any channel state information. Since we
have already shown that the problem with long-term power constraints is the more interesting and challenging one, and since
the purpose of this section is to offer a comparison with previous results, we further focus only on the scenario of average
power constraints and mixed strategies.
Unlike in the corresponding Section V of [1], where all frames were equivalent because of the fast fading channel, in our
present scenario each frame is characterized by a particular channel realization. Since this channel realization is not known to
either the transmitter or the jammer, they both have to allocate some power over each frame, in a random fashion, such that
the transmitter minimizes and the jammer maximizes the probability that the mutual information over the frame is less than
the transmission rate R. In its most general form, the game can be written as
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Fig. 9. Outage probability vs. transmitter power constraint P for M = 1 when J = 10, R = 2, σ2
N
= 10 and h is distributed exponentially, with parameter
λ = 1/6.
min
PM :EPM≤P
max
JM :EJM≤J
EPM ,JM[
min
Pm:
P
Pm≤MPM
max
Jm:
P
Jm≤JM
Pr{
M−1∑
m=0
log
(
1 +
Pmhm
Jm + σ2N
)
≤MR}
]
, (71)
where EPM ,JM denotes statistical expectation with respect to the probability distribution of PM and JM . The form of (71)
suggests two levels of power control: a first one which deals with the allocation of power between different frames, and a
second one which allocates the powers within each frame.
In solving the game, we start as before with the second level of power control. However, this level requires an exact
expression of Pr{∑M−1m=0 log(1 + PmhmJm+σ2N ) ≤ MR}. Note that this probability depends upon the probability distribution of
the channel vector h. A practical way of solving the problem is the following.
Denote Sm = log
(
1 + Pmhm
Jm+σ2N
)
the random variable (depending on hm) which characterizes the instant mutual information
over the m-th block of the frame. We can write the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of Sm as
FSm(x) = Pr{Sm ≤ x} =
= Pr{hm ≤ (ex − 1)Jm + σ
2
N
Pm
} = Fh
(
(ex − 1)Ji + σ
2
N
Pi
)
(72)
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where Fh(x) is the c.d.f. of the channel coefficient hm and we assume that the channel coefficients over all the blocks of a
frame are independent and identically distributed random variables.
We can now compute the p.d.f. (assuming it exists) of Sm as
fSm(x) =
dFSm(x)
dx
=
dFh
(
(ex − 1)Jm+σ2NPm
)
dx
. (73)
Finally, our probability can be written as
Pr{
M−1∑
m=0
log
(
1 +
Pmhm
Jm + σ2N
)
≤MR} =
=
(
FS0 ∗ fS1 ∗ . . . ∗ fSM−1
)
(MR) (74)
where ∗ denotes regular convolution. Due to the intricate expression of this probability, as well as its dependence on the
statistical properties of the channel, we next focus exclusively on the simple case when M = 1.
Particular case: M = 1
For M = 1, we are only concerned with the first level of power control. The game can be written as
min
PM :EPM≤P
max
JM :EJM≤J
EPM ,JMPr{P ≤ (c− 1)
JM + σ
2
N
h
} (75)
or equivalently,
min
PM :EPM≤P
max
JM :EJM≤J
EPM ,JMPr{h ≤ (c− 1)
JM + σ
2
N
PM
}. (76)
In order to provide a good numerical comparison with the results of the previous sections, assume that the channel coefficient
h has an exponential probability distribution with parameter λ. Its cumulative distribution function can thus be written as
F (h) = 1− e−λh, which enables us to write
Pr{h ≤ (c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
} =
= 1− exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
]
. (77)
Denote H(PM , JM ) = 1− exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM+σ2NPM
]
.
By computing the derivatives
dH
dPM
=
= −λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
P 2M
exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
]
< 0, (78)
d2H
dP 2M
=
= λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
P 3M
[
λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
+ 2
]
exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
]
> 0, (79)
dH
dJM
=
= λ(c− 1) 1
PM
exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
]
> 0, (80)
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and
d2H
dJ2M
=
= −(λ(c− 1) 1
PM
)2 exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
PM
]
< 0, (81)
we notice that H is a strictly decreasing, convex function of PM for a fixed JM , and a strictly increasing, concave function of
JM for a fixed PM . Hence, a Nash equilibrium is achieved by uniformly distributing the transmitter’s and jammer’s powers
between the frames:
EPM :EPM≤P
{
1− exp
[
−λ(c− 1)J + σ
2
N
PM
]}
≤
≤ 1− exp
[
−λ(c− 1)J + σ
2
N
P
]
≤
≤ EJM :EJM≤J
{
1− exp
[
−λ(c− 1)JM + σ
2
N
P
]}
(82)
This saddlepoint is an equilibrium of pure strategies, and hence also an equilibrium of mixed strategies. Note that the existence
of such an equilibrium of pure strategies might no longer hold for different probability distributions of h, and this would demand
a search for purely probabilistic strategies. For example, when the c.d.f. of the channel coefficient F (h) is not concave, then
F ((c− 1)JM+σ2NPM ) is no longer a concave function of JM , and hence the optimal jammer strategy is not deterministic.
Numerical evaluations of the system’s performance under the present scenario are presented in the next subsection.
A. Numerical results
The probability of outage as a function of the transmitter’s power constraint P is shown in Figure 10 for M = 1, and under
the assumption that both the transmitter and the jammer distribute their powers uniformly over the frames.
For comparison, the maximin and minimax solutions of the pure strategies game and the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium,
all under the scenario that channel state information is fed back by the receiver, are also shown in the figure.
Note that when the receiver does not feed back the CSI, the system performance suffers degradation. Unlike in the fast
fading scenario of [1], in the present slow fading scenario the increase in the outage probability is significant. The difference
is most visible at low transmitter powers, when not feeding back the channel state information amounts to worse performance
than the pessimistic (minimax) scenario with full CSI.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the jamming game over slow fading channels, with the outage probability as objective. Similarly to the
fast fading scenario, the game with full CSI and average (or long term) power constraints does not have a Nash equilibrium
of pure strategies. Nevertheless, we derived the minimax and maximin solutions of pure strategies, which provide lower and
upper bounds on the system performance, respectively.
In addition, we investigated the Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies. Compared to the fast fading scenario [1], the Nash
equilibrium for the slow fading, full CSI game is much more involved. The difference comes from the fact that frames are
not equivalent. In fact, instead of being characterized by the channel statistics as in [1], the frames are now characterized by
different channel realizations. This results in the existence of an additional third level of power control.
We also showed that for parallel slow fading channels, the CSI feedback helps in the battle against jamming, since if the
receiver does not feed back the channel state information, the system’s performance suffers a significant degradation. We expect
this degradation to decrease as the number of parallel channels M increases, until it becomes marginal for M → ∞ (which
can be considered as the case in [1]).
These results, along with our conclusions from the first part of this paper [1], reveal an interesting duality between the ways
that different communication models behave with and without jamming. As remarked in [1], under a fast fading channel with
jamming, the feedback of channel state information brings little benefits in terms of the overall probability of outage. The
same tendency is observed for the fast fading channel without jamming in [14] (although the performance measure therein is
the ergodic capacity). However, [10] shows that for a parallel slow fading channel, the CSI feedback is quite important. The
improvement of the probability of outage when the channel coefficients are perfectly known to the transmitter is no longer
negligible. The results of our present paper demonstrate that even in the presence of a jammer (which can eavesdrop the
feedback channel and hence obtain the same CSI as the transmitter), CSI feedback improves the transmission considerably.
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APPENDIX I
SHORT-TERM POWER CONSTRAINTS - PROOFS OF MAIN RESULTS
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is an adaptation of the results in Section IV.B of [2], regarding uncorrelated jamming with CSI at the transmitter.
The only difference is that in our case, the power constraints and cost function involve short-term, temporal averages, while
in [2], they are expressed in terms of statistical averages. Nevertheless, the same techniques can be applied.
The set of all pairs (P (h), J(h)) satisfying the power constraints is convex, since the power constraints are linear functions
of P (h) and J(h), respectively. Moreover, the cost function
IM (h, P (h), J(h)) =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
log(1 +
hmPm
σ2N + Jm
)
is a convex function of J(h) for fixed P (h), and a concave function of P (h) for fixed J(h). These properties imply that there
exists at least one saddle point of the game.
Writing the KKT conditions for both optimization problems we get [2]:
− h
σ2N + J(h) + hP (h)
+ λ− γ(h) = 0 (83)
and
− hP (h)
(σ2N + J(h))(σ
2
N + J(h) + hP (h))
+ ν − δ(h) = 0, (84)
where γ(h) and δ(h) are the complementary slackness variables for P (h) and J(h), respectively.
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The three possible cases are [2]: Case 1: P (h) > 0, J(h) > 0; Case 2: P (h) > 0, J(h) = 0 and Case 3: P (h) = J(h) = 0.
For Case 1 both complementary slackness variables are 0, and solving (83) and (84) together we get
λ
µ
=
J(h) + σ2N
P (h)
, (85)
and
P (h) =
h
λ(h+ λ/µ)
, (86)
while for Cases 2 and 3, the solution is plain water-filling [2].
These considerations result in the solutions (5) and (6).
B. Proof of Theorem 1
This proof follows the one described in the Appendix B of [10]. The probability of outage can be written as:
Pr(IM (h, P (h), J(h)) < R) = E[χ{IM (h,P (h),J(h))<R}], (87)
where χ{A } denotes the indicator function of the set A . Replacing the power allocations by the solutions of the game described
by (3) and (4), we define
χ∗(h) = χ{IM (h,P∗(h),J∗(h))<R}. (88)
Then the region U(R,P ,J ) can be written as:
U(R,P ,J ) = {h ∈ RM+ : χ∗(h) = 0}. (89)
We next use the fact that the pair (P ∗(h), J∗(h)) determines an equilibrium of the game (3), (4). Thus, for any random
power allocation P (h) satisfying the power constraint, we can write:
χ∗(h) ≤ χ{IM (h,P (h),J∗(h))<R},with probability 1. (90)
Similarly, for any random J(h), we have
χ∗(h) ≥ χ{IM (h,P∗(h),J(h))<R},with probability 1. (91)
Now pick some arbitrary power allocation functions Pa(h) and Ja(h), which satisfy the short-term power constraints, and
set
P̂ (h) = (1− χ∗(h))P ∗(h) + χ∗(h)Pa(h), (92)
and
Ĵ(h) = (1− χ∗(h))Ja(h) + χ∗(h)J∗(h), (93)
It is easy to see that 1/M
∑M−1
m=0 P̂ (hm) ≤ P with probability 1 , 1/M
∑M−1
m=0 Ĵ(hm) ≤ J with probability 1, and moreover
that
χ∗(h) = χ{IM (h, bP (h), bJ(h))<R}. (94)
Note that transmitter and jammer could pick Pa(h) = 0 and Ja(h) = 0 respectively, but this strategy would not improve
their performances (power cannot be saved), since the only power constraints are set over frames.
Now, using (87), (90) and (91), we get:
Pr(IM (h, P (h), Ĵ(h)) < R) ≥
≥ Pr(IM (h, P̂ (h), Ĵ(h)) < R) ≥
≥ Pr(IM (h, P̂ (h), J(h)) < R), (95)
which proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the original game.
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APPENDIX II
LONG-TERM POWER CONSTRAINTS: PURE STRATEGIES
A. Proof of Proposition 2
Take Problem 1. Let (P∗, J∗) =
(
(P ∗0 , P
∗
1 , . . . , P
∗
M−1), (J
∗
0 , J
∗
1 , . . . , J
∗
M−1)
)
be a solution such that
∑M−1
m=0 P
∗
m = PM,1
and
∑M−1
m=0 J
∗
m = JM,1, and assume that IM (P∗, J∗) > R. Since IM is a continuous, strictly increasing function of P0,
without loss of generality, we can find P ′0 < P ∗0 such that IM ((P ′0, P ∗1 , . . . , P ∗M−1), J∗) = R.
But then P ′0 +
∑M−1
m=1 P
∗
m < MPM,1, which means that (P∗, J∗) is suboptimal (from the transmitter’s point of view), and
hence not a solution.
Therefore, the first constraint IM ≥ R has to be satisfied with equality, i.e. IM = R.
Now take the solution (P∗, J∗), and assume that 1M
∑M−1
m=0 J
∗
m < JM . Then we can find J ′0 > J∗0 , such that J ′0+
∑M−1
m=1 J
∗
m =
MJM . In order for the first constraint IM = R to be satisfied, the value and distribution of PM will have to be modified.
We prove next that the value of PM should be increased, which makes the pair (P∗, J∗) suboptimal (from the jammer’s
point of view), thus contradicting the hypothesis that it is a solution, and proving that the second constraint should hold with
equality.
Assume there is a distribution P′′ = (P ′′0 , P ′′1 , . . . , P ′′M−1) that minimizes PM , under the constraint IM ({Pm}, (J ′0, J∗1 , . . . , J∗M−1)) =
R, such that
M−1∑
m=0
P ′′m ≤ PM,1. (96)
Then, replacing J0 by its old value J∗0 , we have that (P′′, J∗) is either a second solution of Problem 1 (if (96) is satisfied
with equality), or a better choice (if (96) is satisfied with strict inequality). We can readily dismiss the latter case. For the
former case, IM is a strictly decreasing function of J0, thus IM (P′′, J∗) > R, which contradicts the first part of this proof.
The same arguments work for Problem 2.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 is a direct consequence of Theorem 8 in the Appendix II.D of [1]. We restate the theorem here for completeness.
For a complete proof, see the first part of this paper [1].
Theorem 6: Take x, y ∈ L2[R] and define the order relation x > y if and only if x(t) > y(t) ∀t ∈ R. Consider the
continuous real functions f(x), g(y) and h(x, y) over L2[R], such that f is a strictly increasing function of x, g is a strictly
increasing function of y, and h is a strictly increasing function of x for fixed y and a strictly decreasing function of y for fixed
x.
Define the following minimax and maximin problems:
max
y≥0
[
min
x≥0
f(x) s.t. h(x, y) ≥ H
]
s.t.g(y) ≤ G, (97)
max
x≥0
[
min
y≥0
g(y) s.t. h(x, y) ≤ H
]
s.t.f(x) ≤ F, (98)
min
y≥0
[
max
x≥0
h(x, y) s.t. f(x) ≤ F
]
s.t.g(y) ≤ G. (99)
(I) Choose any real values for G and H . Take problem (97) under these constraints and let the pair (x1, y1) denote one of its
optimal solutions, yielding a value of the objective function f(x1) = F1. If we set the value of the corresponding constraints
in problems (98) and (99) to F = F1, then the values of the objective functions of problems (98) and (99) under their optimal
solutions are g(y) = G and h(x, y) = H , respectively. Moreover, (x1, y1) is also an optimal solution of all problems.
(II) Choose any real values for F and H . Take problem (98) under these constraints and let the pair (x2, y2) denote one of
its optimal solutions, yielding a value of the objective function g(y2) = G2. If we set the value of the corresponding constraints
in problems (97) and (99) to G = G2, then the values of the objective functions of problems (97) and (99) under their optimal
solutions are f(x) = F and h(x, y) = H , respectively. Moreover, (x2, y2) is an optimal solution of all problems.
(III) Choose any real values for F and G. Take problem (99) under these constraints and let the pair (x3, y3) denote one
of its optimal solutions, yielding a value of the objective function h(x3, y3) = H3. If we set the value of the corresponding
constraints in problems (97) and (98) to H = H3, then the values of the objective functions of problems (97) and (98) under
their optimal solutions are f(x) = F and g(y) = G, respectively. Moreover, (x3, y3) is an optimal solution of all problems.
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C. Proof of Proposition 4
Take Problem 1. By Proposition 3, if there exists PM,1 such that solving the game in (3) and (4) with the constraint∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤ MPM,1 yields the objective IM (h, {Pm}, {Jm}) = R, then the solution of Problem 1 coincides with the
solution of the game in (3) and (4).
We write this solution as in (5) and (6), but we denote λ = 1/η and µ = ν/η:
P ∗m =
 (λ−
σ2N
hm
)+ if hm < σ
2
N
λ−σ2
N
µ
µ λhm1+µhm if hm ≥
σ2N
λ−σ2
N
µ
(100)
J∗m =
 0 if hm <
σ2N
λ−σ2
N
µ
λhm
1+µhm
− σ2N if hm ≥ σ
2
N
λ−σ2
N
µ
(101)
where λ and µ are constants that can be determined from the constraints
∑M−1
m=1 Jm = MJM and
∑M−1
m=1 I(hm, Pm, Jm) =
MR.
We shall use the following conventions and denotations:
• Without loss of generality, we shall assume that the blocks in a frame are indexed in increasing order of their channel
coefficients. That is, h0 ≤ h1 ≤ . . . ,≤ hM−1.
• Denote xm = Jm + σ2N and x∗m = J∗m + σ2N . Note that
x∗0
h0
≥ x∗1h1 ≥ . . . ,≥
x∗M−1
hM−1
.
• Denote by hp the first block on which the transmitter’s power is strictly positive, and by hj the first block on which the
jammer’s power is strictly positive. Note that hp ≤ hj .
Note that
P ∗m =
[
λ− x
∗
m
hm
]
+
(102)
for all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}, where [z]+ = max{z, 0}.
Given these and (100) and (101) above, we can write:
σ2N
hp
≤ λ < σ
2
N
hp−1
, (103)
σ2N
1 + µhj
hj
≤ λ < σ2N
1 + µ(hj−1)
hj−1
, (104)
MR =
j−1∑
m=p
log
(
λhm
σ2N
)
+
−
M−1∑
m=j
log
(
1
1 + µhm
)
, (105)
Denote by QU [h] denotes the index of the smallest channel coefficient in the frame that is larger than h. With this notation,
we can write
p ≥ QU
[
hj−1
1 + µhj−1
]
(106)
hp−1 <
hj
1 + µhj
(107)
1
M
M−1∑
m=j
 hm1+µhm
hj
1+µhj
− 1
 ≤ JM
σ2N
≤
1
M
M−1∑
m=j
 hm1+µhm
hj−1
1+µhj−1
− 1
 , (108)
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j−1∑
m=QU
h
hj
1+µhj
i log
(
hm
1 + µhj
hj
)
−
−
M−1∑
m=j
log
(
1
1 + µhm
)
≤MR ≤
≤
j−1∑
m=QU
h
hj−1
1+µhj−1
i log
(
hm
1 + µ(hj−1)
hj−1
)
−
−
M−1∑
j
log
(
1
1 + µhm
)
, (109)
where (108) follows from JM =
∑M−1
m=j
[
λhm
1+µhm
− σ2N
]
, and the first inequality in (109) follows since hp−1 < hj1+µhj implies
p ≤ QU
[
hj
1+µhj
]
because there is no other channel coefficient between hp−1 and hp.
It is straightforward to show that for fixed hj the left-most and the right-most terms of inequality (108) are strictly decreasing
functions of µ, while the left-most and the right-most terms of inequality (109) are strictly increasing functions of µ.
Note that
M−1∑
m=j
 hm1+µhm
hj
1+µhj
− 1
 = M−1∑
m=j+1
 hm1+µhm
hj
1+µhj
− 1
 , (110)
and
j−1∑
m=QU
h
hj
1+µhj
i log
(
hm
1 + µhj
hj
)
−
−
M−1∑
m=j
log
(
1
1 + µhm
)
=
=
j∑
m=QU
h
hj
1+µhj
i log
(
hm
1 + µhj
hj
)
−
−
M−1∑
m=j+1
log
(
1
1 + µhm
)
. (111)
That is, by keeping µ constant and replacing hj by hj−1 in both first terms of (108) and (109), we get exactly the last terms
of (108) and (109), respectively.
Finally, we take a contradictory approach. Suppose there exist two different pairs (hj1, µ1) and (hj2, µ2) that satisfy both
(108) and (109) and assume, without loss of generality that hj1 < hj2. Then, in order for (hj2, µ2) to satisfy (108) we need
µ2 > µ1, while in order for (hj2, µ2) to satisfy (109) we need µ<µ1. Thus hj is unique. Note however that the relations above
do not guarantee the uniqueness of µ.
For the optimal hj , the constraint
∑M−1
m=1 Jm = MJM translates to
M−1∑
m=j
λhm
1 + µhm
= MJM + (M − j)σ2N . (112)
while the constraint IM (h, {Pm}, {Jm}) = R is already given in (105). The left hand side of (112) is a strictly increasing
function of λ for fixed µ and a strictly decreasing function of µ for fixed λ, while being equal to a constant.
Again, for a contradictory approach, suppose there exist two different pairs of (µ1, λ1) and (µ2, λ2) that can generate
different solutions. If we assume, without loss of generality that µ1 > µ2, then, in order for (112) to be satisfied by both
pairs, we need λ1 > λ2. But this can only mean that under (µ2, λ2) the transmitter allocates non-zero power to more channel
coefficients than under (µ1, λ1). This remark simply says that the index p at which the transmitter starts transmitting is a
decreasing function of λ, and can easily be verified by (102).
Looking now at (105), we observe that its right hand side is a strictly increasing function of λ for fixed µ and a strictly
increasing function of µ for fixed λ, while being equal to a constant. In other words, if (105) is satisfied by the pair (µ1, λ1),
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then it cannot also be satisfied by (µ2, λ2). Thus, the pair (λ, µ) that satisfies both (105) and (112) is also unique. But once
hj , λ and µ are given, hp is uniquely determined. Therefore there cannot exist more than one solution to Problem1.
Similar arguments can be applied to show that the solution of Problem2 is unique.
D. Proof of Proposition 5
Since the solution is unique, it follows that PM (JM ) is a strictly increasing function. By closely inspecting the form of
the solution in (100) and (101), it is straightforward to see that if JM →∞, then Jm →∞ for all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}. If
the required PM were finite, this would imply IM → 0, which violates the power constraints of Problem 1.
For Problem 1 we prove that the resulting PM (JM ) function is continuous and concave in several steps. We first show in
Lemma 1 that the optimal jammer strategy {x∗m}M−1m=0 is a continuous function of the given jamming power JM . Lemma 2
proves that PM ({xm}) is continuous and has continuous first order derivatives. This implies that PM (JM ) is in fact continuous
and has a continuous first order derivative. Finally, Lemma 3 shows that for any fixed hp and hj the function PM (JM ) is
concave.
Lemma 1: The optimal jammer power allocation {x∗m}M−1m=0 within a frame is a continuous increasing function of the given
jamming power JM invested over that frame.
Proof: It is clear that x∗m is continuous and increasing as a function of JM if hp and hj are fixed. At any point where
either hp or hj change as a result of a change in JM , the optimal jamming strategy {x∗m}M−1m=0 maintains continuity as a result
of the uniqueness of the solution (Proposition 4).
Lemma 2: Both PM ({xm}) and the derivatives dPMdxm are continuous functions of {xm}
M−1
m=0 .
Proof:
Consider any two points X1 = (x1,m)M−1m=0 and X2 = (x2,m)
M−1
m=0 and any trajectory T that connects them.
For a given vector X = (xm)M−1m=0 , the required transmitter power is
PM =
M − p
M
 c(∏M−1
m=p hm
)

1
M (M−1∏
m=p
xm
) 1
M
−
− 1
M
M−1∑
m=p
xm
hm
. (113)
Note that p depends upon the choice of X. For fixed p, the continuity and differentiability of PM (X) are obvious. Thus, it
suffices to show that these properties also hold in a point of T where p changes.
If we can show continuity and differentiability when p is decreased by 1, then larger variations of p can be treated as
multiple changes by 1, and continuity still holds.
Recall the assumption that the channel coefficients are always indexed in decreasing order of the quantities xmhm . Let Xk =
(xk,m)
M−1
m=0 be a point of T where the transmitter decreases the index of the block over which it starts to transmit from pk to
pk − 1, and denote by T1 the part of the trajectory T that is between X1 and Xk, and T2 = T \ T1.
Since Ppk−1 = 0, we know that λ does not change in this point, since
1
M
M−1∑
m=p
[
λ− xm
hm
]
=
1
M
M−1∑
m=p−1
[
λ− xm
hm
]
= PM . (114)
Define the “left” and “right” limits PM (Xk−) and PM (Xk+) as:
PM (Xk−) = lim
X→Xk
X∈T1
PM (X), (115)
PM (Xk+) = lim
X→Xk
X∈T2
PM (X). (116)
Since RM+ is Hausdorff [15], there exists a small enough neighborhood U ⊂ RM+ of Xk, such that p(X) = pk to the “left” and
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p(X) = pk − 1 to the “right” of Xk on U. We can now write:
PM (Xk+) =
= λ
M − pk + 1
M
− 1
M
M−1∑
m=pk−1
xk,m
hm
=
= λ
M − pk
M
− 1
M
M−1∑
m=pk
xk,m
hm
+
+
1
M
(λ− xk,pk−1
hpk−1
) = PM (Xk−), (117)
where the last equality follows because λ = xk,pk−1hpk−1 . This proves continuity.Similar arguments can be used to show the continuity of the derivatives
dPM
dxn
=
1
M
(
λ
xn
− 1
hn
)
(118)
in Xk (note that λxk,pk−1 =
1
hpk−1
).
Therefore, PM (X) is continuous and has first-order derivatives that are continuous along any trajectory T between any two
points X1 and X2.
Finally, for the last part of our proof:
Lemma 3: For fixed p and j, the function PM (JM ) is concave.
Proof:
We can write
MJM + (M − j)σ2N =
[
c
j−1∏
m=p
(
σ2N
hm
) 1
M
·
·
M−1∏
m=j
(
1
1 + µhm
) 1
M
] M
j−p M−1∑
m=j
hm
1 + µhm
, (119)
and denote
g(µ) =
M−1∏
m=j
(
1
1 + µhm
) 1
j−p
M−1∑
m=j
hm
1 + µhm
(120)
Note that for fixed p and j, JM is a linear function of g.
A similar relation can be found for the required transmitter power PM :
MPM +
1
M
j−1∑
m=p
σ2N
hm
=
[
c
j−1∏
m=p
(
σ2N
hm
) 1
M
·
·
M−1∏
m=j
(
1
1 + µhm
) 1
M
] M
j−p
·
·
M − p
M
− 1
M
M−1∑
m=j
1
1 + µhm
 . (121)
Denote
f(µ) =
M−1∏
m=j
(
1
1 + µhm
) 1
j−p
·
·
(M − p)−M−1∑
m=j
1
1 + µhm
 (122)
and note that for fixed p and j, PM is a linear function of f .
It suffices to show that f(g) is concave. For this purpose, the derivative dfdg =
df
dµ (
dµ
dg )
−1 should be a decreasing function of
g, and hence an increasing function of µ.
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Computing the derivatives from (119) and (121) we get:
df
dg
=
df
dµ
dg
dµ
=
=
1
j−p
(
(M − p)−∑M−1m=j 11+µhm)− PM−1m=j hm(1+µhm)2PM−1
m=j
hm
1+µhm
1
j−p
∑M−1
m=j
hm
(1+µhm)2
+
PM−1
m=j
h2m
(1+µhm)2PM−1
m=j
hm
1+µhm
(123)
Arguments similar to those in [1] apply in proving that above the derivative increases with µ. Looking at the right hand
side of (123) (the “large fraction”), we notice that the first term in the numerator increases with µ. For the second term
in the numerator, it is clear that as µ increases, its numerator decreases faster than its denominator. This implies that the
whole numerator of the “large fraction” is an increasing function of µ. Similarly, the first term in the denominator is clearly
a decreasing function of µ. The only thing left is the second term of the denominator. It is straightforward to show that its
derivative with respect to µ can be written as
d
dµ
∑M−1
m=j
h2m
(1+µhm)2∑M−1
m=j
hm
1+µhm
=
1[∑M−1
m=j
hm
1+µhm
]2 ·
·
{M−1∑
m=j
h2m
(1 + µhm)2
2 −M−1∑
m=j
h3m
(1 + µhm)3
·
·
M−1∑
m=j
hm
(1 + µhm)
}
(124)
If we consider the fact that for any two real numbers a and b we have
(a2 + b2)2 − (a+ b)(a3 + b3) = −ab(a− b)2 (125)
and the summations in (124) are positive, it is easy to see that the second term of the denominator of the “large fraction” is
decreasing with µ. Hence overall the derivative in (123) increases with µ.
APPENDIX III
LONG TERM POWER CONSTRAINTS: MIXED STRATEGIES
A. Proof of Theorem 4
Denote the solution of the game in (3) and (4), where the jammer is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Jm ≤ JM (pM ) and
the transmitter is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤ pM by ({Pm,1}, {Jm,1}), and the solution of the game in (3) and (4),
where the transmitter is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤ PM (jM ) and the jammer is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Jm ≤ jM by
({Pm,2}, {Jm,2}).
Denote the solution of the game in (3) and (4), where the jammer is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Jm ≤ jM and the transmitter
is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤ pM by ({Pm,0}, {Jm,0})..
By the Proposition 2, we must have IM ({Pm,1}, {Jm,1}) = R and IM ({Pm,2}, {Jm,2}) = R, where IM ({Pm}, {Jm}) =
1
M
∑M−1
m=0 log(1 +
Pmhm
Jm+σ2N
).
We will show that (i) even if the jammer’s power jM is different from JM (pM ), the transmitter’s strategy is still optimal;
(ii) even if the transmitter’s power pM is different from PM (jM ), the jammer’s strategy is still optimal.
Assume the transmitter plays the strategy given by {Pm,1}.
If jM = JM (pM ), it is clear that the optimal solution for both transmitter and jammer is the solution of the game in (3)
and (4), where the jammer is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Jm ≤ jM and the transmitter is constrained to 1M
∑M−1
m=1 Pm ≤ pM .
In this case, it is as if each player knows the other player’s power constraint.
If jM < JM (pM ), then by Lemma 1 we have that Jm,0 < Jm,1 ∀m. Since IM ({Pm}, {Jm}) is a strictly decreasing function
of {Jm} (under the order relation defined in the Appendix III of [1]), this implies that IM ({Pm,1}, {Jm,1}) > R. Note that
{Jm,0} is the jammer’s strategy when the jammer knows the transmitter’s power constraint pM . Thus we have shown that
when the transmitter plays {Pm,1} and jM < JM (pM ), the jammer cannot induce outage over the frame even if it knew the
value of pM .
Assume that the jammer plays the strategy given by {Jm,2}. A similar argument shows that if pM < PM (jM ), or equivalently
jM > JM (pM ), the transmitter cannot achieve reliable communication over the frame even if it knew the exact value of jM .
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This shows that ({Pm,1}, {Jm,2}) is a Bayes equilibrium [12] for the game with incomplete information describing the
power allocation within a frame.
B. Proof of Proposition 9
Take any solution {PM (h)∗}, {JM (h)∗} of the KKT conditions and denote by P ∗out the outage probability obtained under
these strategies. By maintaining {JM (h)∗} constant and changing {PM (h)∗}, the resulting probability of outage can only be
greater than or equal to P ∗out, since the original {PM (h)∗} is the solution of a minimization problem with convex cost function
and linear constraints.
Similarly, by maintaining {PM (h)∗} constant and changing {JM (h)∗}, the resulting probability of outage can only be less
than or equal to P ∗out, since the original {JM (h)∗} is the solution of a maximization problem with concave cost function and
linear constraints.
These arguments imply that {PM (h)∗}, {JM (h)∗} is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
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